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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

SOUTH DAKOTA
Sherburn v. Patterson Farms, Inc., 593 N.W.2d 414 (S.D. 1999)
(holding that: (1) trial judge's statement that perhaps an easement had
existed in past did not entitle claimant to new trial; (2) claimant could not
claim prescriptive easement with respect to dike extension built in 1993;
and (3) adjoining landowner was entitled to permanent injunction requiring
claimant to remove dike extension).
In February 1994, Sherburn sought to enjoin Patterson Farms, Inc.
("Patterson") from obstructing the flow of water across his land. Sherburn
claimed that the dike located on Patterson's property caused flooding on his
property. The dike was constructed around 1939, but did not cause
problems until it was enlarged in 1993. The trial court found no
prescriptive easement existed that would allow Patterson to obstruct the
natural flow of watir. The court issued a permanent injunction ordering
Patterson to either remove the dike or install culverts for the flow of water
at ground level. Patterson appealed claiming: (1) entitlement to a new trial
pursuant to an irregularity in the proceedings preventing him a fair trial;
(2) a prescriptive easement was established as a matter of law; and (3) the
trial court abused its discretion in granting a permanent injunction.
In addressing Patterson's entitlement to a new trial, the supreme court
stated that Patterson's reliance on the trial court's statement regarding the
prescriptive easement was misplaced. At the close of the trial, the trial
court stated that a prescriptive easement "probably" existed up to 1980
when the dike was enlarged. Based on this statement, Patterson claimed
the trial court actually ruled a prescriptive easement existed as a matter of
law and that such statement "altered the entire presentation of the case and
impacted all issues before the court." Pursuant to precedent, however, any
expression or opinion by a trial judge extraneous to his opinion has no
binding effect upon the judge himself or anyone else. The supreme court
further stated that even if the trial court erred, Patterson could not show
any prejudice resulting therefrom because it received everything he would
be entitled to even if he had not been "misled." Therefore, this court
denied a new trial.
The court then addressed whether a prescriptive easement existed as a
matter of law. In South Dakota, a prescriptive easement allowed a
dominant or upper property owner to reasonably discharge surface water
over lower property through natural watercourses. The court stated that in
order to claim a prescriptive easement an individual must show "open,
continued, and unmolested use of the land in the possession of another for
the statutory period [of twenty years]. The cause of action accrues and the
statute begins to run when the landowner sustains the damage from the
overflow."
However, if obstructions erected by a defendant were
involved, the cause of action accrues when the damages were sustained,
not necessarily when the obstructions were erected. Because there was no
damage to Sherburn's property before the 1993 enlargement, the court
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concluded no prescriptive easement existed as to the 1993 extension. The
statutory period could not have begun until Sherburn suffered damage after
the construction.
Finally, the supreme court found the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in granting a permanent injunction. The court found that the
trial court addressed the four basic factors that need consideration when
granting a permanent injunction. Those factors were: (1) Did the party to
be enjoined cause the damage? (2) Would irreparable harm result without
the injunction because of lack of an adequate or complete remedy? (3)
Was the party to be enjoined acting in bad faith or was its injury-causing
behavior an "innocent mistake?" and (4) In balancing the equities, was the
"hardship to be suffered by the [enjoined party] ... disproportionate to
the ... benefit to be gained by the injured party?" However, because no

flooding damage occurred until after the 1993 extension construction, the
supreme court held that the permanent injunction was only proper for the
extension. Therefore, the supreme court reversed and remanded the case
requesting the trial court limit the permanent injunction to removal of the
western extension or the installation of culverts allowing the flow of water
at ground level.
Anna Litaker

TEXAS
Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep't, 8 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 1999)
(allowing petitioners, on remand, to assert that respondents undertook a
duty to make the river safe for park visitors and that it breached that duty).
Wilton and Wilford Wilson, brothers, drowned in the Pedernales River
that flooded while they were fishing. The accident occurred on a stretch of
the river that borders the Pedernales Falls State Park. The brothers'
beneficiaries ("Beneficiaries") sued the Texas Parks and Wildlife
Department ("Department") for wrongful death and survival damages on a
premise liability theory. The Beneficiaries claim that the Department had
the authority to set certain areas of the river off limits to visitors and that it
established a flood early warning system which failed on the day of the
accident. The district court found evidence that the Department attempted
to control the conduct of its visitors even though it had no control over the
river itself.
The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the
Department's negligence proximately caused the Wilson brothers' deaths.
The appeals court reversed the judgment, finding that the Department did
not own the river; therefore, ownership, not control, was at issue before
the jury. That court further stated that because control was not an issue
placed before the jury, remand on that issue was proper.
On remand, the supreme court held that there was no evidence that the
Department controlled the river condition. Therefore, it found that remand

